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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 







Case No. 15323 
GREAT SOUTHWEST FIRE 





BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by the named insured against the 
insurance company on a policy of fire insurance covering a warehouse 
building which was damaged by fire, 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COOR T 
The case was submitted to the trial court by way of stipulation 
as to the material facts, From a judgment in favor of the defendant, the 
plaintiff appeals, 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment and judgment in 
els d matter of law, 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant, Great Southwest Fire I 
nsurance Co'Tlpar:i,; 
issued fire insurance policy #F442655, dated May 10 1975 na . 
• , min~t 
Plaintiff, J. O. Kingston, as the insured, ai:d covering a warehouse 
building located at approximately 875 South 800 West, Salt Lake Citr, 
Utah (Exhibit "B"), In September, 1975, during the term of effective 
coverage under the insurance policy, the building burned, causingda~ 
i 
thereto in excess of $20, 000, 00, the limits of coverage under thepoli. 
(Tr, 2-3), 
I 
On July 3, 197 5, prior to the fire, Salt Lake City Corporii 
I 
filed a complaint in condemnation, seeking to condemn the parcel of 
property upon which the insured building was located, in order that a 
Senior Citizens' Center could be constructed thereon, On August 12, I 
I 
1975, still prior to the fire, the city was granted an Order of Immedi: i 
I 
Occupancy with respect to the property sought to be condemned. De;i' 
the order of immediate occupancy, J, o. Kingston was still in actual : 
h. mer· 
possession of the building and was using it as a warehouse for 15 ! 
. s conte;:.j 
chandise when the fire occurred, The condemnation act10n wa 1 
I 
to the properl)' i: ! and the final order of condemnation vesting legal title 
Salt Lake City Corporation, was not signed until May, 1976, eightmo·:i 
'b't "A") after the building had been burned (Tr, 2-3 and Exh1 1 ' 
i 
........... 
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During the pendency of the condemnation action, J. o. 
Kingston commenced this action against Great Southwest Fire Insurance 
Co:npany, seeking recovery under the terms of the insurance contract 
(R. Z-3), The trial court found that" J. O. Kingston did not have an 
insurable interest in the warehouse building at the date it burned, and 
therefore, denied recovery (R. 91-92), 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED A5 A MATTER OF LAW IN FINDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF HAD NO INSURABLE INTEREST IN THE INSURED BUILDING 
AT THE TIME OF THE FffiE. 
The bas is for the ruling in the court be low was that the 
plaintiff had no insurable interest in the insured property at the time of 
the loss, as a result of the condemnation activity of Salt Lake City Cor-
poration, Section 31-19-4, U.C.A, (1953), provides as follows: 
'{l) No contract of insurance on property or of any 
interest therein or arising therefrom, shall be enforce-
able except for the benefit of persons having an insurable 
interest in the things insured, 
(2) 1Insurable interest• as used in this section means 
any lawful and substantial economic interest in the safety 
or preservation of the subject of the insurance free from 
loss, destruction, or pecuniary damage," 
In determining whether or not an insurable interest exists 
in a p1 t · l · b l · r lCU ar case, the courts have generally adopted a 11 era view 
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in order to uphold the enforceability of the insurance contract, 
In the case of Hill v, Safeco Insurance Co:np3.nv, 2! .. 
96, 448 P, Zd 915 (1969), this Court stated: 
"A . t t . l ny_ i_n eres rn property, egal or equitable, quali'.'e:. 
cond1t1onal, .contingent or absolute, or merely the ro::· 
to use property with or without p3.yrnent of rent is 5 ~:. 
ficient to create finsurable interest', 11 ' 
In the Hill case, the named insured under a policyoi:::., 
had deeded the property covered (his house) to his wife, The wiie,·.: 
the named insured each had children from a previous marriage,~'.'· 
wife disinherited her husb3.nd and her husband 1 s children by will,l" 
her assets to her own children, As it happened, the house burne:'. :: 
killing both the named insured and his wife in the process, and the ::d 
children sought recovery from the insurnace company on the polic\·: 
insurance, The insurance comp3.ny defended the claim, allegingt2;: 
named insured had no insurable interest in the property at the time:: 
burned, since he had given up legal title tc his wife, who had in tur:. 
willed the property to her own children, The Court rejected the i&o::. 
cornpanyrs argument, holding that where the husband had purchas::: 
property, p3.id the insurance premium, lived in the house for sel'e:'· 
years, paid the taxes, and had the right of occup3.ncy, he hadar.i~s;:.' 
interest therein, and his heirs \Vere awarded recovery on tae pol'.c\·. 
insurance, 
The case of Stewart v. Co'Tlmerce ln°ur·1~--
I 
.... 
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S'.c. ~~c.lls, N. Y., 114 Ut, 278, 198 P. 2d 467, was one involving auto-
;:i;:.c'Je insurance, but one of the issues was whether or not the claimants 
tad an insurable interest in the vehicle at the time it was damaged, The 
1.utomo'.iile was owned and insured by a gentleman who died leaving six 
te:rs, The automobile p3.ssed to the heirs, who decided to sell it, One 
of the heirs located a buyer and sold the car for a price to be determined 
:n occordance with the O. P, A, regulations then in effect, The buyer gave 
the ~eir $400, 00 for the car, took possession of the vehicle, the title and 
~e~istration certificates, and started towards Logan, Utah, where he 
'>'.'i.5 to determine the official 0, P.A. price and arrange to have the title 
and registration properly transferred, In route to Logan, the buyer ran 
off the ro'id, causing extensive damage to the car, and the insured1s 
estate sued to recover under the insurance policy, The Court rejected 
tile insurance comp3.ny1s defense that the estate lacked an insurable 
interest in the car at the time it was damaged, stating: 
"***it is apparent that no valid sale was completed. If 
such is the case the fact that an abortive attempt was 
made, would not relieve the defendant from liability 
under the policy, as the estate would have an insurable 
interest in the car until such time as a completed sale 
was effectuated. 11 
National Farmers Union Property and Casualty Co:npany 
~~~ 4 Ut, 2d 7, 286 P. 2d 249 {1955), was another case where 
t".'' C~ttrt v;as asked to determine whether or not an insurable interest 
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existed in the named insured. In that case, Tho!npson had sold h' f· 
l s d ~- I 
to one Hardy. Hardy had taken possession of the farm except f i 1 or o~:t 
building, which Thomp3on continued to occupy with Hardy's permissic 
for storage of machinery and equip!ne!lt, Thompson continued to occu:, 
the building up to 3.nd including the date it was destroyed by fire, In 
upholding a jury•s finding that Tho!npson retained an insurable intere11 
in the building even though it had been sold to another, the Co·Jrt mado : 
the following pertinent comments: 
"**~'if he has an interest of any character in the proper:, 
1 
so that he will or may derive some pecuniary benefitfrc:; 
the co::itinu_ed existenc~ of the. p:;:-operty or suffer pzcunia· 1' 
loss from its destruct10n by fire, he may prop~rly bi;,:, 
to meet the statutory requirement o~ having a lsubstanti2:' 
economic interest•, If this test is met, that suffices, ani I 
the nature of his interest or the status of title or posse:,' 
is immaterial, 11 
The Court went on to say: 
"It is not disputed that Thomp3on did retain possessionc' 
the building that his machine:;:-y was stored therein, ar.: 
' " that he had never turned the keys over to Mr. Hardy, 
The Court also pointed out that there was some testimo: 
that Thompson had obligated himself to be responsible for the builciini 
1 
"d f r the during his possession and that the owner expected to be P11 0 
occupancy. Tl P
-on had an 
The Court ruled that upon such facts, 10rn ° 
~ 
h t and that the l·ns urance comp
3nY ; ... 
insurable interest int e proper y, 
pay on the contract of insurance, 
. S\tpport the P' Several cases from other jurisdictions 
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position that he is entitled to reco,·er in this case, holding that as long as 
the property owner retains either legal title or possession, he has an 
insurable interest sufficient to allow recovery under the insurance con-
tract, In the case at bar, the plaintiff had both legal title and possession, 
Among such cases is Irwin v, Westchester Fi!:_e Insurance Co., 58 Misc, 
441, 109 NYS 612, affd without op 133 App Div 920, 118 NYS 1115, affd 
without op 199 NY 550, 93 NE 376, where the court ruled that the plaintiff 
still had an insurable interest in a frame addition to her house which had 
burned, even though the addition violated the City Fire Code and had been 
declared a nuisance and ordered abated by the Court prior to the fire, 
In this particular case, the City had even commenced demolition of the 
structure pursuant to the abatement order, at the time it. burned, The 
owner, as in our case, retained possession and occupancy of the condemned 
portion of the structure, and as she was the legal owner, was declared to 
have a sufficient interest in the structure to support a reco'lery under the 
insurance policy, 
An insurable interest was also found to be present in the 
case of Rosenbloom v, Maryland Insurance Comp-3.ny, 258 App Div 14, 
l5 NYS 2d 304, There, the property owner contracted on September 23, 
1938 to sell his property to the Syracuse Housing Authority for the sum 
of $l2, 600, 00, Under the terms of the contract, the Authority had the 
option for 180 days to acquire the property by condemnation rather than 
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by purchase. On September 30, 1938, the building on the propertyw, 
damaged by fire, and the Authority then rescinded the sales c t 
on ract e-
condemned the property, paying the property owner the sum of $12 )' 
'. 
The court declared that the plaintiff's insurable interest at the time cl 
the fire was the full value of the insured buil.ding, not just the diminis' 
market value, as determined by the difference between the originals,: 
price and the award in condemnation. 
The Illinois Court, in the case of American National Boe. 
& Trust Comp3.ny of Chicago v. Reserve Insurance Co'Tlp:i.ny, 38 lll.l.•: 
Zd 315, 187 NE Zd 343 (1962), also held that the building owner had;c 
insurable interest in a building which burned after condemnation proce 
ings had commenced, but before the condemnation proceedings were 
co~pleted, There, the Court said: 
"It is the defendant's next contention that recovery shout: 
be denied on the grounds that the insured lacked an insur: 
interest in the premises at the time of the fire, '~*~' Tbe 
petition was still pending and undisposed of at the time_c 
the fire. A jury subsequently entered a verdict of $6k .• 
in the condemnation proceedincrs representing the value .. 
the property at the time the pe~ition to condemn was fde;:· 
Defendant suggests that the jury's verdict having been'. 
firmed * * ~' title re late s back to the date of filing the p; 
. b the conies to condemn, upon payment of compensat10n Y 
authority, 
. . sofar as i: 
We think there is no merit to this contention in b 
is directed to the relevant question of plaintiff's insur1~' d t the city. interest on the date of the fire. At that a e, Attl:e 
petition was pending but had not been actc_d uponl.e al tit: 
date of the fire there had been no change tn the g 
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to t\,e property, or even a jury verdict in the proceedings 
by the city. At that stage of the condemnation proceedings 
the city might have abandoned its petition altogether upon 
payment of the property owners' expenses in the proceed-
ings, as provided by statute ~' ~' ~'. This being so, it seems 
clear to us that plaintiff did have an insurable interest in 
the property on the day of the fire, The fact that the city 
continued its proceedings against the property after the 
fire, rather than exercising its statutory prerogative to 
abandon them, is certainly a fe>rtunate circumstance for 
the plaintiff, but it is not an event which defendant may 
seize in an effort to avoid liability on its contract of in-
surance, 
* ~' ~' Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the condem-
nation award received by plaintiff does not limit or bar 
plaintiff's right to recover in this action, 11 
The Virginia Court reached the same conclusion in the case 
of Home Insurance Co, v, Dalis, 206 Va, 71, 141 SE 2d 721 (1965). In 
this case, two barns located on plaintiff's property were insured against 
fire, On April 22, 1963, the State Highway Commission recorded a 
certificate describing the road right-of-way and stating the fair market 
value of the plaintiff's lands located within said right-of-way to be 
$113, 666, 00, Under Virginia law, upon such recording, the title to the 
property vested in the Commonwealth, The barns were destroyed by 
fire on April 27, 1963, and on April 29, 1963, the State notified plaintiffs 
to vacate the barns within 60 days, On September 27, 1963, plaintiffs 
applied for and obtained an order of the Court, distributing the sum of 
$113, 666, 00, the full amount of the appraised value before the fire, to 
plaintiffs for the property. The insurance code of Virginia contains the 
sanie requirements that recovery can be had under a contract of insurance 
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on property, only by one having an insurable interest therein, as fc:·: 
in Utah law, and the Virginia code defines "insurable interest" prec 
as does Section 31-19-4, U.C.A. (1953). cited above, The Courtr'::O 
in the Virginia case, that on the date of the fire, plaintiffs had an ic:.-
interest in the barns sufficient to support the. contract of insurance,,. 
that their interest was to be measured by the value of the barns at t'.: 
date. In rejecting the insurance comp3.ny1s defense that plaintif:s t:: 
no insurable interest in the barns on the date of the fire, the Co·Jrt o: 
"Under the provisions of the aforementioned statutes t'.: 
Co:nmo~we2.lth acquired, upon the filing of the Co"'::J'.55 
er 1s certificate, title to plaintifis' property, but itv:<0s 
subject to defeasance and other steps were necessary 
before it could ripen into an absolute and indefeasible:: 
In the present case, the plaintiffs had a lawful and subs:o: 
tial economic interest in the safety of the barns on tee'.: 
of the loss, They were not only in possession and occ,::· 
of the buildings, in which they had stored valuable ma:e:: 
when the fire occurred, but had the right to continue o:·:.· 
pying them for sixty days from April 29, 1963, -·· .,;_ 
Defendant says that plaintiffs would suffer no pecuniar:; .. 
by reason of the fire and they are not entitled to recoi-.:: 
under the policy of insurance sued on, It argues that'.' 
permit them to recover wo:ild amount to a double reco.c 
In Clements v. Clements 167 Va 223, 188 SE 154, rt:: 
------------' - . ' "<e ofH"::· Court cited with app:::-oval the holding in the c,_, ~
v. Pepper, 166 Mass 288, 44 I\1E 222,223, 33 LR.-\·; ... 
• t ·" ··- ,, the co .. -· 55 Arn St Rep 404, wherein it was said: ··· ~' b te· 
d · es tot e of insurance is a personal contract, an inur ,,, 
efit of the p3.rty with whom it is made, and by wh_o~,;> 
. . . t f - dcrnn1t1 °o" premiums are p11d. It is a contrac o in · h· ::: 
. -t sense Lt. loss. The sum paid is in no prop'.!r or JU" 
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of prop2rty, (Citing cases) ~' **Whether the amount of 
indemnity received by the defendant for her loss was more 
or less than the value of her interest cannot affect the 
plaintiff1 , 167 Va at p, 233, 188 SE at p. 158, 
Here plain tiffs 1 claim for recovery is based on contract, 
The risk of destruction at the time the fire occurred re-
mained with the plaintiffs and the insurance contract was 
personal, They had an insurable interest in the buildings 
when they were destroyed by fire and they suffered a loss, 
Defendant cannot escape liability of its contractual obli-
gations by reason of plaintiffs' dealings with a third party 
who is not even a party to this proceeding, (Citing cases) 
In a recent Oregon case, Fenter v, General Ace Fire &: 
resolved a similar question, In this case, property formerly owned by 
the plaintiff had been taken by the County for non payment of taxes, An 
Oregon statute (ORS 312, ZOO) provided that all rights of redemp~ion to 
properties so taken terminated after one year, at which time, the prop·erty 
·.'1o•ild be formally deeded to the County, The one year perio:i for redemp-
tion had expired and the property had been so deeded, when the insured 
building thereon was destroyed by fire, As in Utah, Oregon law (ORS 
743, 033) requires the named insured to have an insurable interest in 
the subject property of the insurance contract before recovery is allowed. 
Even so, the Co'.lrt ruled that the former owner's pecuniary interest was 
r.ot too insubstantial to constitute an insurable interest, in view of a 
statute which provided that the County~· at any time, sell and convey 
:·· 2 ty to the former owner or his assigns for the delinquent taxes, 
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Obviously, the County having absolute legal title, also had the right t: 
sell and convey the property to any other person, but the plaintiffv"' 
given judgment, nonetheless, 
In the case at bar, the plaintiff obviously realized aneco: .. 
omic benefit from the continued existence of the insured building wh'.c: 
housed his merchandise, and did in fact suffer severe economic loss 
when it burned down with his possessions inside, Although it may be 
true that Salt Lake City had the right to require the plaintiff to remore 
his possessions from the building at any time, until the plaintiff actLl2i 
did. so, either voluntarily or by coercion, he had an economic interest 
in the building's continued existence, if only as shelter and protectio'' 
for the merchandise inside, The plaintiff had a right to continue top': 
tha.t interest, which is clearly insurable under the case law cited, and 
the defendant has never offered to return any p3.rt of the premium piid 
by the plaintiff as consideration for the insul'ance contract issued bi· 
the defendant, 
At the time of the fire, the condemnation proceedings'"'' 
still pending, and the plaintiff still had legal title to the property, wbic. 
did not p3.SS to Salt Lake City until May, 1976, Section 78-34-IS, U,C. 
{1953), provides: 
·1 b d given, t. 
"When payxnents have been made and the on h tastt'.' 
the plaintiff elects to give one, as required ~y \ eudgm" 
preceding sections, the court must make a fina l 
ll 
-
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of condemnation, which must describe the property con-
demned and the purpose of such condemnation, A copy 
of the judgment must be filed in the office of the recorder 
of the county, and thereupon the property described 
therein shall vest in the plaintiff for the purpose therein 
specified, " 
Under Section 78-34-14, U.C.A. (1953), and Section 78-
34-16, U. C. A. (1953), it was possible on the date of the fire, that title 
would never have passed from the plaintiff, had the final award not been 
p,1id or the condemnation proceedings not been completed for any other 
reason, Such a possibility, even though remote, is enough to find an 
insurable interest in the owner, 
A primary objection raised to the p3.yment of the claim in 
this type of case, is that such p3.yment would constitute double payment 
for the property and amount to a windfall to the plaintiff. Even if this 
were true, the previously cited cases declare that such a benefit to 
the plaintiff would not invalidate the insurance contract or void the insurance 
comp:i.ny1s obligation to pay for the loss it agreed to insure against, In 
this case, however, such an allegation of double payment is not well 
founded, as a review of the pleadings in the condemnation case entered 
as evidence (Exhibit "A") in this case, particularly the Stipulation for 
Judgment and the Judgment, will show, The anticipated recovery under 
the insurance policy was basic to the settlement figure accepted by the 
plaintiff. 
On the other hand, to disallow recovery ':>Y the plaintiff 
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would amount to a windfall to the insurance comp.3.ny, by allowing it to 
avoid p3.yment for a loss which it voluntarily insured against, and for 
which it accepted and retained the premiums, simply because of the acti 
of one not even a p3.rty to this lawsuit, creating a situation which plaint:' 
did not desire and over which he had no control, 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon all of the foregoing considerations, the trial 
court erred in finding that the plaintiff had no insurable interest in the 
building on the date it burned, and its judgment should be reversed anJ 
judgment granted to the plaintiff in the sum of $20, 000, 00, the amount 
of coverage afforded under the policy issued by the defendant, 
Respectfully submitted, 
Carl E, Kingston 
53 West An"elo Avenue 
Salt Lake city, Utah 84115 
Attorney for Fla inti ff and Appoi' 
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